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In this paper, we extend the Romer (1990) model in two ways. First, we include 
energy consumption of intermediates. Secondly, intermediates become heterogeneous 
due to endogenous energy saving technical change. However, aggregate effective 
capital is still subject to endogenous technical change of the ‘love of variety’ type, as 
in the original Romer model. We show that the resulting system can still generate 
steady state growth, but the growth rate depends negatively on the growth of real 
energy prices. The reason is that real energy price rises will lower the profitability of 
using new intermediate goods and hence the profitability of doing research, ceteris 
paribus. Hence, in this set-up rising real energy prices are not countered by stepping 
up research, but provide a negative stimulus to R&D instead. We also show that in 
these circumstances the introduction of an energy tax that is recycled in the form of an 
R&D subsidy may actually increase growth, while increasing the capital intensity of 
production at the same time. 
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 1.1 Introduction 
 
In most energy-economy models currently in use, technology is an important determinant of 
energy efficiency improvements. Nonetheless, in those models technology itself is weakly 
handled, mainly because of the focus on the energy impact of (autonomous) technological change 
rather than on the underlying forces that drive it.
1 Modern growth theory by contrast, and 
especially the work by Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), focuses on some of the 
Schumpeterian aspects of endogenous technical change, i.e. profit seeking motives as incentives 
to engage in research and development, and creative destruction as a disincentive. The latter 
brings technical change itself within the reach of policy makers. 
In this paper, we extend the Romer (1990) model in two ways. First, we introduce intrinsic 
productivity differences between intermediates that are embodied in those intermediates. In this 
way we acknowledge the empirical observation that productivity growth and investment in 
equipment and machinery are positively correlated (see e.g. Gregory and James (1973) and 
Hulten (1992)). These productivity differences between intermediates provide a horizontal 
product differentiation setting, giving rise to ‘creative wear and tear’ instead of the ‘full 
destruction’ known from the Aghion and Howitt model. Secondly, we regard effective capital as a 
bundle consisting of ‘raw’ capital and energy. This enables us to see what policy conclusions can 
be derived from a model that exhibits endogenous technical progress fuelled by economic 
incentives. More in particular, we want to have a look at what rises in (real) energy prices may 
mean for the inducement of technical change, for long term growth perspectives and the role of 
(technology) policy in this respect.  
In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we do not pay any serious attention to the 
question of the sustainability of growth. For our present purposes, we take that for granted by 
assuming that energy can be made available in any quantity at given real energy prices. 
The set-up of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we briefly summarise how we have 
modified the Romer (1990) model. In section 3, we show what continuously rising real energy 
                                                 
1 See Verberne (1995) for an overview.  
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prices may mean for growth, and how an energy tax (possibly recycled in the form of a subsidy 
on research costs) may affect growth. Finally, we provide a summary and some concluding 
remarks in section 4. 
 
1.2 The Modified Romer Model
2 
 
The Final Output Sector 
 
As in Romer (1990), we use an Ethier production function for final output Y: 
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where Y L  is labour input used in final-output production and 
e
i x  are the effective capital services 
obtained from using the i
th type of intermediate good. 
The level of demand for each intermediate follows from the first order conditions of the final 
output sector which provide the inverse demand functions for the various inputs, i.e. all the 
individual intermediates and labour. 














α α  (2) 
 
where  Y P  is the price of final-good,  Y w  is the wage-rate in the final-goods sector, and 
e
i p  is the 
rental price of the effective services of the i
th intermediate good. We now take final output to be 
                                                 
2 We simplify the original Romer model somewhat by distinguishing only high skilled labour. For more 
mathematical details, one is referred to van Zon et al. (1999).  
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the numeraire, i.e.  1 = Y P . Then, in a situation of perfect competition on the final output market 
and the factor input markets, the first order conditions for profit maximisation are given by: 
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Equation (3.A) provides the inverse demand function for the sector that produces the i
th 
intermediate, whereas equation (3.B) describes the requirement that the real wage rate must equal 
the marginal productivity of labour. Equation (3.A) implies a price elasticity of the demand for 
effective capital services equal to  ) 1 /( 1 α ε − − = . 
 
The Intermediate Goods Sector 
 
We define effective capital 
e
i x  supplied by the intermediate goods sector as a Cobb-Douglas 
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Note that  i λ  is here the ‘total-factor’ productivity of raw capital and energy taken together, in 
terms of effective capital.  i λ  is represented as Hicks-neutral technical change (i.e. the type of 
                                                 
3 In a growth context, a Cobb-Douglas function comes in very handy indeed. Opportunistic as we are though, it 
should be stressed that the literature describes two polar cases with regard to capital-energy substitution. The first 
case assumes that substitution possibilities are non-existent which implies capital/energy complementarity. The idea 
of capital-energy complementarity is supported by e.g. Berndt and Wood (1979) and, at least from a macro-economic 
perspective, by Solow (1987). In the other case, energy is a direct substitute for other factors of production, like 
labour, materials, etc. (see e.g. Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) and Dean and Hoeller (1992)). 
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technical change that augments all factors in the same way), with proportional rate  i λ ˆ , but since 
we have used a Cobb-Douglas function, it can also be interpreted as ‘energy augmenting/saving’ 
technical change at rate  ) 1 /( ˆ β λ − i . In order for our model to be able to generate steady growth, 
we furthermore define: 
 
ς λ λ i i ⋅ = 0  (5) 
 
with  0 ≥ ς . Assuming profit maximisation behaviour by the intermediate sector again, it follows 
that the intermediate goods sector must also be minimising the costs of producing an effective 
unit of capital at the same time. Assuming that factor prices are given for an individual producer 

























q r c i i  (6) 
 
where r is the real rental rate of raw capital, and q is the real price of energy. Unit costs of 
producing an effective unit of capital fall with the blueprint number i, since they depend 
negatively on ‘total factor productivity’  i λ . The total cost of producing all effective units of 
capital using blueprint i is simply the product of  ) , ( q r ci  and 
e
i x . Because of perfect competition 
on the factor markets and the linear homogeneity of equation (4), it follows for an individual 
producer of intermediate goods that  ) , ( q r ci  is also the marginal cost of producing 
e
i x . 
Consequently, the profit maximising rental price of an effective unit of capital for the final goods 
producing sector, i.e. 
e
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Note that it follows directly from Shephard’s Lemma and (7) that: 
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e , cf. equation (1))
4, and total energy 
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Assuming that the growth rate of real energy prices, the real rate of interest and LY are constant in 
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Equation (10) shows that the steady state growth rate tends to exceed the growth rate of the 
number of blueprints, if  0 ≥ ς . However, continuous rises in real energy prices call for a more 
intensive use of raw capital as a substitute for energy, which would lower the steady state growth 
                                                 
4 Note that K
e is actually a CES aggregate of the underlying services of intermediates.  
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rate in turn. Moreover, the higher the effective capital elasticity of energy (i.e.  β − 1 ) is, the 




The Blueprint Sector 
 
The blueprint sector uses labour to produce blueprints next to the experience accumulated during 
the production of all previous blueprints: 
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where  δ  represents the productivity of the blueprint generation process, while LA=L-LY is the 
amount of labour used in generating blueprints. L is the total labour force. The proceeds from 
selling blueprints are paid as wages to R&D workers: 
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where we have used (3.A), (7) and (11) as well as the expression for instantaneous profits. Note 




i A x p ) 1 ( α − = Π  is 
instantaneous profit. Moreover,  q a A ˆ )) 1 /( ) 1 ( ( ˆ α β π − − − =  is the ex-post growth in profits due to 
changes in marginal costs.
6 
 
                                                 
5 A high value of 1-￿ implies that the marginal costs of effective capital consist largely of energy costs. 
6 Note that we assume that only real energy cost may change in the steady state.  
  6 
Labour Market Equilibrium 
 
Labour market arbitrage ensures that wY=wA. Substitution of equations (12) and (3.B) into this 














αδ ) 1 (
ˆ ) 1 (
 (13) 
 
where  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( α ςα α − + − = ′ z . From equation (13) it is clear that continuously rising real energy 
prices reduce the profitability of generating new blueprints. In that case, the allocation of labour 
will change in favour of final output generation. This also happens if the real interest rate rises, 
which calls for less round about ways of producing output, i.e. less knowledge intensive 
production. 
 
Steady State Results 
 
Equation (13) can be substituted into equation (11), the result of which in turn can be substituted 
into equation (10), giving us the steady state growth rate that the system is able to generate, for 
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Likewise, the ‘growth demand-side’ as given by optimum saving behaviour is implicitly 
described by the requirement that: 
 
θ ρ / ) ( ˆ ˆ − = = r Y C  (15) 
 
                                                 
7 See van Zon et al. (1999) for the mathematical details.  
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where  θ σ / 1 =  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ρ  is the discount rate, and C is 
private consumption.. 
The equilibrium steady state growth rate is now easily obtained by eliminating the real interest 
rate r from equations (14) and (15), giving: 
 
() )) 1 /( 1 ) 1 ( ˆ / ( ˆ α α β α ρ δ
θ α
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The corresponding equilibrium value of the real interest rate is then given by: 
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By substituting (16.B) into (13), we obtain the corresponding equilibrium allocation of labour: 
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Equation (16.C) shows that the amount of labour allocated to the final output sector increases 
with the rate of discount (future consumption possibilities are valued less, hence the greater 
emphasis on current consumption through an increase in final output). Moreover, an increase in 
δ  would lower the amount of labour allocated to final output production, while an increase in θ  
has ambiguous effects. Note too that an increase in ς  favours growth (cf. equation (16.A)), while 
equations (16) reproduce Romer’s growth results for z
’=1 and  0 ˆ = q . 
The analysis is graphically represented in Figure 1, which will also be of help later in 
evaluating changes in steady state growth results arising from policy changes. By connecting 
each point of the relation LY(r) in quadrant IV to a corresponding point in quadrant I, passing 
through quadrants III and II, we can show how a shift in LY(r) leads to a change in the 
equilibrium steady state growth rate. A downward shift in LY(r) in quadrant IV as depicted in the 
Figure I due to, for instance, an increase in q ˆ , leads to a steady state with lower growth, as 
indicated by the curved arrow in quadrant I.  
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The model just described shows that economic growth is favoured by technical change that 
improves the productivity of raw capital and/or energy in generating effective capital. The model 
also shows that steady state growth is possible in a situation where real energy prices are 
growing. However, in that case the rate of growth of the system is lower than with constant real 
energy prices. Moreover, the equilibrium real interest rate would be lower too. The reason is 
simply that substitution away from energy towards raw capital leads to more capital intensive 
production, and hence to a lower marginal productivity of capital.  
We conclude that in our set-up continuously rising real energy prices have a negative effect on 
economic growth, but this effect is counteracted to some extent by changes in the productivity of 
Y ˆ
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the factors which generate effective capital services. However, it seems probable that the Cobb-
Douglas specification we have chosen for that generator function over-estimates long run 
substitution possibilities between raw capital and energy as they exist in practice. Because of that, 
it is also likely to under-estimate the negative growth effects of rising real energy prices. Holding 
this in mind, we will now turn to the effects of introducing an energy tax with and without 
recycling in the form of an R&D subsidy. 
 




The policies we want to investigate are the introduction of an energy tax, with and without 
recycling in the form of an R&D subsidy to the same amount. Obviously, the introduction of a 
tax will change the marginal cost of the provision of effective capital services by intermediates 
and hence the profitability of producing these intermediates. That in turn will influence the 
allocation of labour over its two uses: R&D and final output generation. The latter will definitely 
influence the steady state growth rate, apart from having level effects as well. In the remainder of 
this section, we will concentrate on the growth effects, though. 
 
Equilibrium Growth Effects of an Energy Tax Without R&D Recycling 
 
The effects of an introduction of an ad valorem energy tax with rate τ  without recycling are 
easily traced through adjusting the labour market arbitrage condition. We do this by replacing the 
price of energy q by  q ) 1 ( τ + in the marginal cost of effective capital services as given by 
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Equation (17.A) shows that growth will be negatively affected by the introduction of an 
energy tax, since the numerator decreases and the denominator increases with τ . From (17.C), 
we see that the denominator decreases with τ , thus leading to a reallocation of labour from 
research and development towards final output. This is consistent with lower growth. 
 
Equilibrium Growth Effects of an Energy Tax with R&D Recycling 
 
In the case of R&D recycling, the labour market arbitrage condition can be rewritten as: 
 
) ) /(( 1 / A Y A Y w L L qE w w − + = τ  (18) 
 
The other structural equations of the ‘growth supply-side’ (i.e. equations (10) and (11)) remain 
unchanged. Unfortunately, the effects of the introduction of an energy tax plus recycling are not 
easy to trace analytically, but we can develop an intuition as follows.  
By using (3.A), (7) and (11) again as before, as well as (9.B) and the expression for 
instantaneous profits, the ratio of the real wage rate in the final output sector and in the R&D 
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Similarly, the RHS of equation (18) is given by: 
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The question now is how the relation LY(r) that is implied by the equality between LHS and RHS 
changes with τ , i.e. how a change in τ  would shift LY(r) in the LY, r –plane (cf. Figure 1). This  
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enables us to infer the effects of the introduction of an energy tax with R&D recycling on the 
equilibrium steady state growth rate as follows. If the introduction of an energy tax with 
recycling lowers LY for a given value of r (and q ˆ ), this results in an upward shift of the supply-
side relation between Y ˆ  and r in the (Y ˆ , r) plane. Since the ‘growth demand-side’ remains 
unchanged, this implies a rise in equilibrium steady state growth rate, that depends solely on the 
labour allocation effects of the introduction of an energy tax accompanied by an R&D subsidy. 
Through implicit differentiation of (18), we obtain the derivative of LY with respect to τ , 
while making use of equations (19.A) and (19.B): 
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Because the denominator of  (20) is negative, the derivative of LY with respect to τ is negative if 
the numerator is positive. But the latter requires the ratio of R&D workers to final output workers 
to be smaller than  ) 1 /( ) ) 1 ( (
) 1 ( 1 α τ α
β − +
− −a . For  0 ≈ τ  and reasonable values of α , this is almost 
certainly true. Hence, we conclude that in this case, the introduction of an energy tax with 




There are two important conclusions to be drawn from the policy analysis above. First, we have 
shown that the introduction of an energy tax in the context of the revised Romer model is not 
enough by itself to spur R&D efforts. Rather, these are negatively affected, because either real 
energy price changes or the introduction of a tax lowers the present value of a blueprint, which in 
turn reduces the marginal productivity of research labour. In that case, we would expect a 
decrease in the allocation of labour to R&D. However, the subsidy on wage cost in the blueprint 
sector can actually more than compensate the fall in the marginal productivity of labour, so that 
in this case we can observe faster growth than before the tax. Nonetheless, the model is clear  
  12 
about what happens to R&D: an increase in the user price of effective capital will not induce 
energy saving technical change, as one would expect that to happen at first sight. While new 
(already known) energy technologies that aren’t economically feasible at low prices of carbon 
based fuels might be adopted at sufficiently high fuel prices, this does not imply that (basic) 
research will necessarily be stepped up at these higher prices.
8 Moreover, the low mark-ups 
implied by the use of a Cobb-Douglas production function provide little incentive for the research 
sector to engage in energy saving technical change in the first place. Conversely, we would 
expect research activity to fall less in a situation with relatively low substitution possibilities 
between labour and other production factors (including energy). The latter implies lower price 
elasticities of the demand for intermediate goods. Our second conclusion therefore is that a Cobb-
Douglas production function probably underestimates the level of activity in the research sector 
after the introduction of a tax on energy use and a corresponding subsidy on wage costs in the 
research sector.  
 
1.4 Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have presented a model that is an extension of the Romer (1990) model. We 
have introduced endogenous energy saving technical change into that model by assuming 
effective services of intermediates to be provided by a raw-capital/energy bundle. Moreover, we 
have allowed intrinsic productivity differences between intermediates that are due to embodied 
technical change. We show that the model is still able to generate steady growth. Moreover, the 
growth rate now depends positively on the rate of embodied technical change, and it is higher 
than the original growth rate in the Romer (1990) model. However, the rate of growth of the 
system now also depends negatively on the rate of growth of real energy prices, implying that 
continuously rising real energy prices will tend to slow-down growth. Due to the use of a Cobb-
Douglas function to describe the substitution possibilities between energy and raw capital, we 
                                                 
8 In reality, one might expect a spur in applied research regarding newly adopted energy technologies that have 
become profitable at higher energy prices. We did not cover ex post improvements in technologies, however.  
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probably under-estimate the negative growth effects of rising real energy prices. The reason is 
that certainly in the long run substitution possibilities between raw capital and energy are likely 
to be more limited than is implied by the use of a Cobb-Douglas function. This is because there 
are absolute limits to the efficiency of energy conversion that are implied by the laws of nature: 
physics  ‘abhors’ an infinitely high (marginal) productivity of energy. This implies that the 
asymptotic properties of a Cobb-Douglas production function (or any production function 
obeying the Inada conditions with respect to energy) exaggerate actual substitution possibilities 
between capital and energy in the long run. The relevance of physical limits to the efficiency of 
energy conversion is recognised by Smulders (1995), for instance. However, Smulders argues 
that the implied limits to sustainable growth may be circumvented by increasing the use of 
unlimited inputs like knowledge in the provision of goods and services. The (rhetorical) question 
is whether there are limits to the substitutability of knowledge for material inputs, since the more 
immaterial inputs to some product are, the less material the final product will have to be. 
Obviously, human needs like food, shelter and so on, can not be fulfilled with largely immaterial 
products. In the long run then, Baumol’s law is probably as harsh as physics. 
We have also seen that the growth in real energy prices will decrease the profitability of using 
new intermediate goods and hence the profitability of doing research. In addition to this, the final 
output producers can easily substitute labour for effective capital in the case of a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. The implied price elasticity of the demand for effective capital results in a 
relatively low mark-up for intermediate goods producers on their marginal production costs. This 
reduces the present value of the profit streams in comparison with a situation with relatively low 
elasticities of substitution between labour and effective capital. The latter would provide bigger 
incentives to do research. But, in order to have the model work as one would expect it a priori 
(i.e. increasing R&D activities when rising real energy prices indicate that there is a supply 
problem), one would have to consider to adjust the general framework in such a way that it also 
allows for applied R&D that improves the productivity characteristics of an intermediate ex post. 
Pending such adjustments of our model, we conclude that at least the negative growth effects of 
continuously rising real energy prices or the introduction of an energy tax, can be mitigated by 
recycling the tax proceeds in the form of subsidies to R&D.  
  14 
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